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ABSTRACT
As a popular means for capturing behavioural requirements, sce-
narios show how components interact to provide system-level func-
tionality. If component reliability information is available, scenar-
ios can be used to perform early system reliability assessment. In
previous work we presented an automated approach for predict-
ing software system reliability that extends a scenario speciﬁca-
tion to model (1) the probability of component failure, and (2) sce-
nario transition probabilities. Probabilistic behaviour models of
the system are then synthesized from the extended scenario spec-
iﬁcation. From the system behaviour model, reliability prediction
can be computed. This paper complements our previous work and
presents a sensitivity analysis that supports reasoning about how
component reliability and usage proﬁles impact on the overall sys-
tem reliability. For this purpose, we present how the system reli-
ability varies as a function of the components reliabilities and the
scenario transition probabilities. Taking into account the concur-
rent nature of component-based software systems, we also analyse
the effect of implied scenarios prevention into the sensitivity anal-
ysis of our reliability prediction technique.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
D.2.1[SoftwareEngineering]: Requirements/Speciﬁcations—elic-
itation methods (scenarios), methodologies; D.2.2 [Software En-
gineering]: Design Tools and Techniques—state diagrams; D.2.4
[Software Engineering]: Software/Program Veriﬁcation—model
checking, reliability, statistical methods; D.2.10 [Software Engi-
neering]: Design—methodologies
General Terms
Design, Languages, Reliability, Veriﬁcation
Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for
personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are
not made or distributed for proﬁt or commercial advantage and that copies
bear this notice and the full citation on the ﬁrst page. To copy otherwise, to
republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior speciﬁc
permission and/or a fee.
WADS ’05 May 17, 2005, St. Louis, MO, USA.
Copyright 2005 ACM 1-59593-124-4/05/0005 ...$5.00.
Keywords
architecture models; labelled transition systems; software reliabil-
ity prediction; scenario speciﬁcation; sensitivity analysis
1. INTRODUCTION
Software reliability engineering is an important aspect of many
system development efforts, and consequently there has been a
great deal of research in this area [6, 4]. One important activity
included in software reliability engineering is reliability predic-
tion [4]. A promising compositional approach to predicting reli-
ability of component-based systems early in the lifecycle is to base
the prediction on scenarios of system usage.
Scenarios have been widely adopted as a way to capture system
behavioural requirements. Message Sequence Charts (MSCs) are
a widely accepted notation for scenario-based speciﬁcation. MSCs
are classiﬁed into two types: Basic MSCs (BMSCs) and High-level
MSCs (HMSC). The BMSCs are equivalent to the UML Sequence
Diagrams (SDs), which model sequential message exchange be-
tween components. HMSCs are a widely used notation to compose
BMSCs through three fundamental constructs: vertical composi-
tion (where two BMSCs are composed sequentially), alternative
composition (deﬁning that the system could alternatively choose
one of the BMSCs to follow) and iterative composition (which
composes a sequence of BMSCs). An HMSC is a directed graph,
whose nodes refer to BMSCs and whose edges indicate the accept-
able ordering of the BMSCs. HMSCs allow stakeholders to reuse
scenarios within a speciﬁcation and to introduce sequences, loops
andalternativesofBMSCs. ThesemanticsofanHMSCisthesetof
sequences of interactions that follow some maximal path through
the HMSC.
In previous work, we presented a scenario-based approach to
reliability prediction of concurrent systems by synthesizing archi-
tecture model from scenario speciﬁcation [8]. The contribution of
this paper is to show how our reliability prediction technique can
provide guidance towards enhancing the reliability of the software
system. We complement our technique with sensitivity analysis to
identify components and usage proﬁles with greater impact on the
system reliability. We use the Boiler Control system of our previ-
ous work as a way to exemplify our sensitivity analysis. For this
purpose, we present how the system reliability is sensitive to the
(1) components reliabilities and (2) scenario transition probabili-
ties. These two analyses can help us to identify components and
scenarios transitions that could threat the reliability of the software
73system. Taking into account the concurrent nature of component-
based software systems, we also analyse in this paper what effects
the prevention of undesirable implied scenarios cause to our relia-
bility prediction technique.
Succinctly, sensitivity analysis of software reliability can be per-
formed in two different ways: analytically, where a general func-
tion can be derived for all systems, or experimentally, where results
are obtained through measurement. Cheung indicates analytically
how to improve the system reliability by differentiating the system
reliability with respect to the reliability of the program modules [2].
Siegrist presents a more ﬁne-grained analytical sensitivity analysis
by making the partial derivative of system reliability with respect
to the reliability of the system states [9]. The sensitivity analysis
of the scenario-based method of Yacoub et al. [12] involves exper-
imentally analyzing the system reliability as a function of (1) the
component reliability, (2) the reliability of transition between com-
ponents, and (3) the scenario usage proﬁle based on a numerical
solution (rather than an analytical one like Cheung’s). We follow
the experimental approach by presenting plots of system reliability
whose curves are interpolated over sampled values for the elements
to which our prediction technique is sensitive.
Throughout thispaper weuse a variantof theBoiler Control Sys-
tem example presented by Uchitel et al. [11]. The Boiler Control
system in Figure 1 consists of four components: Sensor, Control,
Database and Actuator. In the upper-left corner of the ﬁgure, we
depict the HMSC speciﬁcation of the Boiler, which composes ﬁve
BMSCs: Initialise, Register, Analyse, Terminate and End. Note
that the variables appearing in curly brackets in the ﬁgure are an ex-
tension to MSCs that we brieﬂy explain in Section 2. The paper is
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Figure 1: The Message Sequence Chart Speciﬁcation for the
Boiler Control System, with Example Probability Values.
structured as follows: In Section 2, we present some background on
our reliability prediction technique. In Section 3 we present sensi-
tivity analysis for our technique showing how the system reliability
can be described as a function of the components and the transi-
tions between the scenarios. In Section 4 we analyse the impact
that implied scenarios have in our reliability prediction technique.
In Section 5 we compare the reliability prediction curve prior to
and after accounting for implied scenarios. Finally, in Section 6 we
present our conclusions and discuss directions for future work.
2. BACKGROUND
In this section we present the overall principles behind our method
to predict software system reliability. The method is based on the
annotation of a scenario speciﬁcation with probabilistic properties
and the use of a probabilistic labelled transition system (LTS) syn-
thesised from the scenario speciﬁcation for the software reliability
prediction. We refer the reader to our earlier paper for a more de-
tailed explanation of our model [8].
2.1 Reliability Analysis Using Scenarios
The method comprises ﬁve major steps: (1) annotation of the sce-
narios, (2)synthesisoftheprobabilisticLTS,(3)constructionofthe
stochastic matrix, (4) system reliability prediction, and (5) implied
scenario detection.
In the ﬁrst step, we annotate the scenarios (i.e., the HMSC and
BMSCs) with two kinds of probabilities, the probability of transi-
tions between scenarios PTSij and the reliability of the compo-
nents RC.
The transition probability PTSij is the probability that the sys-
tem will exhibit the behaviour speciﬁed in scenario Sj after execut-
ing scenario Si. This information would be normally derived from
an operational proﬁle for the system [5]. Thus, from scenario Si,
the sum of the probabilities PTSij for all successor scenarios Sj
is equal to one. As the PTSij relates to the transition between sce-
narios, theseprobabilitiesareannotatedonthecorrespondingedges
of the HMSC, as shown on the HMSC of Figure 1. For the purposes
of illustrating our method on the Boiler example, we use the values
depicted in Figure 1 for the PTSij. The values for the PTSij are
based on the assumption that the system executes the scenario Reg-
ister (which causes sensor readings to be entered into the database)
far more frequently than the scenarios Analyse and Terminate, and
that when it does execute Terminate there is an equal probability of
reinitialising and shutting down.
The component reliabilities RC are annotated on the BMSCs, as
also shown in Figure 1. Without loss of generality, we use coarse-
grained, single values for the overall component reliabilities; in
general, we could associate reliabilities with individual messages
and/or segments of component timelines. The values in Figure 1
for the reliability of the components reﬂect the assumption that the
Database is a highly reliable, mature commercial software product,
that the Sensor and Actuator are components whose hardware in-
terface to the sensed/actuated phenomena will eventually fail, and
that Control is a complex software subsystem that still contains la-
tent faults.
The second step of our method is to synthesise a probabilistic
LTS from the annotated scenario speciﬁcation. This step is an ex-
tension of the synthesis approach of Uchitel et al. [10]. Our ex-
tension exploits recent probabilistic extensions to the LTS formal-
ism [1] and involves enhancements to the LTS synthesis of Uchi-
tel et al. [10]. The enhancements have the effect of mapping the
probability annotations of the scenario speciﬁcation into probabil-
ity weights for transitions in the synthesised architecture model.
The probability weights are computed correctly in the process of
reducing each component LTS to its deterministic, minimal form.
Concluding the process of the probabilistic LTS synthesis, the
system architecture model is constructed as the parallel composi-
tion of the LTSs synthesized for each component. The probability
weights of the composed LTS are computed according to the notion
of generative parallel composition deﬁned by D’Argenio et al. [3].
At the end of this step, it follows that for each node of the synthe-
sized architecture model, ∀i such that 1 ≤ i ≤ n,
n P
j=1
PAij = 1,
where n is the number of states in the LTS architecture model and
PAij is the probability of transition between state Si and Sj of the
composed LTS; PAij = 0 if the transition (Si,Sj) does not exist.
In the third and fourth steps of our reliability prediction method,
74the architecture model synthesised in the second step is interpreted
as a Markov model, and we apply the method of Cheung [2] to
compute the reliability prediction. In particular, the transition prob-
ability weights of the architecture model are mapped into a square
transition matrix whose row entries sum to one. So as to conform to
Cheung’s model, we have to make sure that there is only one initial
and one ﬁnal scenario in the speciﬁcation. This is the reason why
we include the scenario End in our MSC speciﬁcation as depicted
in Figure 1.
2.2 Implied Scenarios
It has been shown that given a scenario speciﬁcation, it may be im-
possible to build a set of components that communicate exclusively
through the interfaces described and that exhibit only the speciﬁed
traces when running in parallel [11]. The additional unspeciﬁed
traces that are exhibited by the composed system are called implied
scenarios and are the result of specifying the behaviour of a sys-
tem from a global perspective yet expecting the behaviour to be
provided by the components, which have only a local system view.
The Boiler Control System of Figure 1 has implied scenarios, and
Actuator Control Database Sensor
start
pressure
query
stop
start
Figure 2: Implied Scenario Detected.
Figure 2 shows one of them. From the speciﬁcation we see that the
Boiler Control System is expected to exhibit a trace ”start, pres-
sure, query, data, command ...” and that component Control inter-
acts with Database only through messages query and data. How-
ever, in the implied scenario of Figure 2 a query is being performed
immediately after start.
From the reliability prediction point of view, the existence of an
implied scenario means that the Boiler produces a trace that reveals
a mismatch between behaviour and architecture. In that case, the
model can exhibit behaviour (an implied scenairo) that has not yet
been validated and that, depending on whether it describes intended
or unintended system behaviour, can impact system reliability. If
wedecidethattheoccurrenceofthetraceisdesirable, anewBMSC
containing the trace is added and placed appropriately in the HMSC
composition. But if we consider the occurrence of the trace in Fig-
ure 2 as undesirable, the Boiler architecture model should be con-
strained in such a way that the implied scenario cannot occur. In
both situations, the reliability must be recalculated. We can use the
approach described by Uchitel et.al. to build such a constraint [11].
From here on, we refer to the model where we apply those con-
straints as the Constrained Model, while the unconstrained model
we refer to as the Architecture Model.
3. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS
In this section we illustrate some sensitivity analyses that can be
performed for our reliability prediction technique. We carry out
two different analyses of our technique: (1) as a function of the
components’ reliability and (2) as a function of the transition prob-
ability between scenarios. The analyses are exempliﬁed using the
Boiler Control system.
3.1 System Reliability as a Function of Com-
ponent Reliability
This analysis consists in varying the system reliability as a func-
tion of the components’ reliabilities with the purpose of identifying
components that have the greatest impact on the reliability of the
software system. The method consists of varying the reliability of
one component at a time and ﬁxing the others to 1. The transi-
tion probability values are those for PTSij presented in Figure 1,
where i and j represent respectively the from and to scenarios of
the transition. Figure 3 shows the graphs of the reliability of the
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Figure 3: The System Reliability of the Architecture Model as
a Function of the Component Reliabilities.
system architecture model as a function of the component reliabil-
ity. Note that the component Database has a large impact on the
system reliability, in such a way that the system reliability drops
quickly Database reliability decreases below 100%. We can ini-
tially attribute this to the fact that the system reliability is directly
proportional to the number of requests that each component pro-
cesses. But not only, otherwise Sensor would have the strongest
impact on the system reliability.
Weconsiderthisresultduetothehigherprobabilityoftransitions
to scenarios where Database takes part than to scenarios where
Sensor takes part. The Database is executed in scenarios Register
and scenario Analyse. According to the Figure 1, the outgoing tran-
sitions of scenario Register have chances of following three differ-
ent paths: (1) 70% chance that scenario Register will execute again,
(2) 20% chance that scenario Analyse will be executed and (3) 10%
chance that scenario Terminate will be executed. This gives com-
ponent Database 100% chance that it is executed, considering suc-
cessful the transition from scenario Initialise to scenario Register,
followed by 70% chance from the execution of the Register loop
transition and another 20% chance of transition from scenario Reg-
ister toscenarioAnalyse. Ontheotherhand, theSensor participates
in scenarios Initialise, Terminate and End. Chances that the Sensor
will be invoked correspond to 100% for Initialise execution, 10%
for the execution of scenario Terminate and 50% for the execution
of scenario End. Compared to the results for the Database, we can
ﬁgure out why Database has a higher impact on the reliability of
the Boiler compared to the Sensor.
Components Control and Actuator identically show less impact
on the system reliability. This is because they are always invoked
in the same scenario, Analyse, the same number of times, once.
Therefore, they are expected to equally have less impact on the
overall system reliability.
3.2 System Reliability as a Function of Tran-
sition Probability
This analysis consists in varying the system reliability as a func-
tion of the scenario transition probabilities. Considering scenarios
75with multiple outgoing transitions, we want to ﬁnd out if scenario
transition probabilities have a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on our reliabil-
ity predictions. In case that inﬂuence is signiﬁcant, we want to
ﬁnd out which of those transitions has higher impact on system re-
liability. Using the Boiler system as an example, we analyse the
impact of outgoing transitions from scenarios Register and Termi-
nate, as the other scenarios have only one outgoing transition with
unitary probability transition. To run this experiment, we keep the
component reliabilities values in Figure 1. Taking one transition
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Figure 4: The System Reliability of the Architecture Model as
a Function of the Transition Probabilities
of scenario Register and scenario Terminate is enough to analyse
the sensitivity of the system reliability as a function of the transi-
tion probability. This is due to the fact that outgoing transitions of
a scenario sum to a unity. Varying one transition, we vary the re-
maining outgoing transitions of the same scenario proportionally,
so that transitions sum to 1. For instance, consider the outgoing
transitions of scenario Register in Figure 1. For instance, if we
change PTSRegReg from 0.7 to 0.1, we allocate the remaining 0.9
to PTSRegAna and PTSRegTer in a way that preserves the ratio
between them (0.6 and 0.3, respectively). For further information
on probabilistic composition of concurrent processes, we refer the
reader to D’Argenio et.al [3].
The results depicted in Figure 4 show that outgoing transitions
from scenario Terminate have more impact on the overall system
reliability than outgoing transitions from scenario Register. This
impact is a result of the role that scenario Terminate plays in the
whole Boiler system. Intuitively, this can be reasoned by the fact
that the higher the probability of transition from Terminate to Ini-
tialise, the higher the chance that the whole system will fail, as
both scenarios comprise the end and the beginning of an iteration
throughthesystem. Conversely, thehigherthechancethetransition
from Terminate to End, the higher the system reliability, meaning
fewer loops will happen from Terminate to Initialise and therefore
fewer chances for the failure of the system.
4. THEIMPACTOFIMPLIEDSCENARIOS
ON THE SYSTEM RELIABILITY
As we identiﬁed in section 2, the Boiler Control System presents
an implied scenario that is considered undesirable for the system
speciﬁcation. From the reliability prediction point of view, it means
that the Boiler produces a trace that reveals a mismatch between be-
haviour and architecture. Preventing the occurrence of those traces,
we conduct the experiment in the same way we applied in Sec-
tion 3. We then obtain the Constrained Model and analyse the sys-
tem reliability as follows. The results are depicted in Figures 5
and 6.
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Figure 5: The System Reliability of the Constrained Model as
a Function of the Component Reliabilities.
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Figure 6: The System Reliability of the Constrained Model as
a Function of the Transition Probabilities.
Figure 5 shows the graphs for the system reliability of the Con-
strained Model as a function of the component reliabilities. Com-
paring to previous results presented in Figure 3, shows that the
system reliability as a function of each component increases when
the Constrained Model is applied for the Boiler system. The Con-
strained Model also has an impact on the system reliability as a
function of the transition probability. Results depicted in Figure 6
compared to those depicted in Figure 4, show a considerable in-
crease on the system reliability when the Constrained Model is ap-
plied for the Boiler system. Therefore, the implied scenarios show
a considerable inﬂuence on software reliability prediction.
5. COMPARING THE RELIABILITY PRE-
DICTION CURVES
In previous sections, we compute reliability predictions in the in-
ﬁnite extreme over all possible executions, as provided by Cheung
model [2] and our previous work [8]. In this section, we compute
reliability predictions as a function of the number of scenario exe-
cutions.
To measure the system reliability after a certain number of sys-
tem executions, we start from the Cheung deﬁnition that the system
failure probability, E, is the probability of reaching state F (faulty
termination) from the initial state N1:
E = P
n(N1,F) (1)
P represents the stochastic matrix with all the state transitions of
76thesynthesizedLTS,includingthetransitionstotheabsorbingstates
C (correct termination) or F, (faulty termination). P
n(i,j) is the
probability that starting from state i, the chain reaches state j at or
before the n
th step. As a result of Equation 1, we have a matrix
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Figure 7: The System Reliability as a Function of the Fre-
quency of Scenario Executions.
that, after n steps, results in the probability that execution traverses
from state N1 to the ﬁnal faulty state F. Three steps have to be
carried out in order to obtain the graphs in Figure 7: (1) Multiply
P with itself for discrete number of steps n: P
n; (2) Obtain from
P
n the probability of failure of the system E: the probability of
reaching the absorbing fault state F from the initial state N1; (3)
Calculate the reliability of the system as R = 1 − E.
The analysis of Figure 7 shows that the greater the number of
scenarios executed, the more noticeable is the difference between
the reliability predicted for the Architecture Model and the Con-
strained Model. Furthermore, the reliability ﬂattens out at around
300 scenario executions for the Architecture Model and 70 for the
Constrained Model, as the likelihood of avoiding the End scenario
becomes minuscule after those points.
6. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
Inthispaper, wehavepresentedsensitivityanalysisofourscenario-
based technique for predicting software system reliability, taking
into account the component structure exhibited in the scenarios and
the concurrent nature of component-based systems.
For future work, we will investigate more deeply the underlying
nature of the implied scenarios and the ways they affect reliabil-
ity, as the results in this paper indicated a considerable inﬂuence
of implied scenarios on software reliability prediction. Also, we
plan to apply our approach on case studies of larger, more realis-
tic systems in order to evaluate its scalability and the accuracy of
the predictions it produces. Additionally, we will carry on previ-
ous work for the purpose of model-driven development, where the
ultimate purpose is to deﬁne reliability properties in the software
design and generating code for different platforms that preserves
those properties [7].
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